Research by consumer groups around the world shows that the liberalization of international food trade has a very fundamental effect on people, especially those in developing countries, who are not always easy to predict, but who can tear the fabric of society apart. As part of the Agriculture Agreement, the WTO should fully consider how such changes disrupt life and the economy in the short term and weigh on national economies and think about how they could improve lives and benefit economies in the future. However, in practice, many non-tariff restrictions have been applied to imports, without the fact that domestic production has been effectively restricted and maintained without any minimal access to imports. In some cases, this objective has been achieved through the application of measures that are not expressly provided for in Article XI. In other cases, country-specific exceptions and exceptions, such as grandfather clauses, derogations and membership protocols, have been taken into account. In other cases, non-tariff import restrictions have been maintained without apparent justification. The Agreement on Agriculture Support currently allows Europe and the United States to spend $380 billion a year on agricultural subsidies. The World Bank rejected the EU-US argument that small farmers need protection and pointed out that more than half of EU subsidies to the Common Agricultural Policy go to 1% of producers, while in the US, 70% of subsidies go to 10% of their producers, mainly agricultural enterprises.  These subsidies flood global markets with sub-priced raw materials, drive down prices and under-rate producers in poor countries, a practice known as dumping. Small-scale farmers in South Korea are being harmed by increased imports of agricultural products and reduced government assistance. Overall, they have been paying more for inputs since 1997 and receiving less for their production.
Although it is impossible to separate this phenomenon from the consequences of the 1997 economic collapse, the AoA restrictions on national aid and trade safeguards may have exacerbated the situation. South Korea`s strong national support and intensive form of agriculture make its small farmers vulnerable to the loss of subsidies, which amounted to $6443 million in 1996 (about 5% of total domestic spending by WTO members). At the same time, since 1993, the government itself has been buying less rice than partly on the way to adapting to the requirements to reduce national aid. While the price of the rice market has become more volatile since the beginning of this cereal policy, the government abandons its stocks if necessary to stabilize prices. Before the Uruguay Round negotiations, it became increasingly clear that the causes of confusion in global agriculture went beyond the import access problems, which had been the traditional centre of gravity of the GATT negotiations. To reach the root causes of the problems, disciplines were considered essential for all agricultural trade measures, including national agricultural policy and agricultural export subsidies. In addition, clearer rules on health and plant health measures were deemed necessary, both in their own legislation and in avoiding the circumvention of stricter rules on access to imports through unjustified and protectionist application of food security, as well as animal and plant health measures. 102 Fischer Boel said that by 2006, almost 90% of direct payments in the EU-25 would already be production neutral: speech/05/511, “Common Agricultural Policy: History and Future,” Washington, DC, 15 September 2005. Ukraine`s Agricultural and Industrial Complex (AIC) accounted for 30% of GDP in 1998.
Agricultural production is gradually being transferred from the state to private hands.